Introduction
In June 2012, President Barack Obama announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, authorizing eligible individuals to request temporary relief from deportation proceedings and the chance to apply for work authorization. President Obama emphasized that DACA was "not a permanent fix" or "a path to citizenship," but only "a temporary stopgap measure."
1 Two years later, in November 2014, President Obama announced the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program, explaining that he was "offering the following deal" to an expanded group of qualifying immigrants: "You can come out of the shadows and get right with the law."
2 Describing this as a "common-sense, middle-ground approach," President Obama explained that this was no "amnesty," and that his executive actions would "not grant citizenship, or the right to stay here permanently, or offer the same benefits that citizens receive . . . . All we're saying is that we're not going to deport you." 3 President Obama's announcements were greeted with intense criticism, with many Republicans charging that he was exceeding his authority. In response to the 2012 announcement, Senator Charles Grassley characterized President Obama's executive order as "an affront to the process of representative government by circumventing Congress . . . with a directive he may not have the authority to execute." 4 In response to the 2014 announcement, Speaker of the House John Boehner asserted that President Obama had "cemented his legacy of lawlessness," and, along with multiple other critics, castigated the President as acting like an "emperor" or a "king."
5 Such characterizations suggested that President Obama, by inappropriately acting outside the bounds of Presidential authority, had somehow unilaterally changed the governmental system of the United States from a constitutional democracy to an autocracy. President Obama's critics charged him with having exceeded his authority as President by "re-writing the law," through altering the legal regime from one in which undocumented immigrants were to be deported to a new regime of "executive amnesty." President Obama's supporters insisted rather that President Obama was acting fully within his executive authority, and merely doing what presidents have always done.
Understanding the terms of this debate requires delving into the complicated legal context, which has resulted in both United States v. Texas, challenging the implementation of DAPA and 4 thus, the statement: "The King is dead. Long live the King!" 11 As Michael Rogin notes, the splitting of these two bodies permitted the distinction between the realm and the person who governed it; the language "identified a body politic subject not to royal prerogative but to rule of law." 12 At the same time, the "king's two bodies" also gives us a language that shows how these two bodies can be, not separated, but re-joined: the office can be absorbed into the officeholder's personal identity, conflating person, power, office, and state. 13 Thus, the perception of President Obama's racialized body as illegitimate also shaped the impression of his policies as illegal.
14 A sizeable portion of the American electorate never accepted "Barack Hussain Obama" as a "natural born citizen" or as a legitimately elected head of state in the first place. Analyzing the legality of prosecutorial discretion without addressing this vitriolic and racially-charged context suppresses how the construction of Barack Obama as illegitimate, and, in particular, as foreign, shaped the assessment of his exercise of power as unlawful.
Lastly, we can only fully understand the casting of President Obama's immigration announcements as illegitimate if we note that the beneficiaries of these programs are not perceived as members of the body politic. Although inside the national territory as a matter of physical presence, undocumented immigrants are still "outside the law."
15 As such, President Obama faced difficulty in persuading critics that he could legally help undocumented immigrants "get right by the law," particularly when his own legitimacy, as the nation's "First Immigrant President," was also at issue. In this telling, the actor, the beneficiaries of the act, and the act itself are all cast as illegitimate through a mutually reinforcing logic; all are "outside the law."
A Dive into the Doctrine
On June 15, 2012, President Obama announced the creation of the DACA program, which instructed executive branch officials to exercise administrative discretion to defer the deportation of undocumented immigrants who had arrived in the United States as children and who met other criteria. 16 Two years later, on November 20, 2014, President Obama announced the DAPA pro- 15 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law 4 (2014) (using the term in two senses: as referring to "migrants outside the zone of permission in US law" and as referring to the exercise of discretion in U.S. immigration law, which responds to fluctuating political and economic pressures, and can be understood as filling in the gap between "law in action" and "law on the books"). 16 Criteria for eligibility were: arrival in the United States before the age of sixteen; being under the age of thirty-one as of the date that DACA was announced (June 15, 2012); residence in the United States since June 15, 2007; graduation from high school or enrollment in school or another educational program; and no conviction for a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanors. After meeting these threshold eligibility requirements DACA approval required the favorable exercise of discretion. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, Memo on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, June 15, 2012, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-usas-children.pdf.
gram, which would have extended this exercise of discretion to undocumented immigrants who were the parents of either U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents and who met other criteria.
17
Qualifying individuals under both DACA and DAPA would have been able to apply for "deferred action," a mechanism through which immigration authorities would deprioritize their removal, thus placing a particular case upon the back burner. If granted deferred action under DACA or DAPA, the individual would have received a renewable but still revocable reprieve from deportation. Initially lasting two years for DACA applicants, President Obama's 2014 announcement would have expanded this reprieve to three years for both DACA and DAPA applicants. President Obama's 2014 announcement would also have changed the qualification criteria for DACA to allow more individuals to apply. 18 Under already existing regulations, a grant of deferred action would make the recipient eligible for authorization to legally work in the United States.
While DACA went into effect on August 15, 2012, DAPA and the expansion of DACA never went into effect, due to legal challenges. 19 DACA, presumably because its young recipients were conceptualized as more deserving and less culpable than DAPA beneficiaries, met with far less public opposition. 20 2014 , suing the Obama administration to prevent the implementation of DAPA and the expansion of DACA. Their complaint, which described President Obama as having "unilaterally suspended the immigration laws" by "executive fiat," was filed in federal court in Brownsville, Texas, in a successful attempt to steer its assignment to U.S. District Judge Andrew Hanen, who had previously vocally criticized the administration's immigration policies. 24 Indicative of Judge Hanen's perspective was his statement at the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction: "I will say that talking not just to me, but to anyone in Brownsville about immigration is like talking to Noah about the flood, both in legal terms and in practical terms. So, I mean, we're the spearhead of the spear." 25 In February 2015, Judge Hanen enjoined DAPA as well as the expansion of DACA. He held that Texas and the other states had standing to sue because they would experience injury given the cost of issuing driver's licenses to noncitizens if they were approved for DAPA; he also held that the administration had failed to subject DAPA and expanded DACA to notice and comment, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 26 Newly binding or "legislative" rules cannot be adopted without notice and comment, and Judge Hanen asserted that DAPA created binding rules. 27 While the Obama administration argued that this was erroneous, as any applicant who met threshold eligibility would not automatically be granted DAPA and that meaningful discretion would still be exercised, Judge Hanen disagreed. Although the administration pointed to past cases in which DACA applicants who met the threshold criteria had still been denied DACA, the 7 court ignored this evidence, gesturing instead toward the high DACA approval rates, and calling the discretionary language in the guidance documents announcing DAPA "merely pretext." 28 Having based his injunction on the unexpected basis of notice and comment, Judge Hanen's opinion also hinted that the argument that President Obama's actions violated the Presidential duty imposed by Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed" might ultimately prevail. The government appealed the preliminary injunction, moving to stay or narrow its scope, but lost before a divided Fifth Circuit panel, which subsequently affirmed the preliminary injunction on November 2015, additionally holding that DAPA extended eligibility for work authorization beyond executive branch authority. 29 In June 2016, a divided Supreme Court, missing its ninth member due to the death of Justice Antonin Scalia and the subsequent refusal of a Republican-controlled Senate to confirm President Obama's nominated candidate, issued a one-sentence per curiam ruling, simply stating that "[t]he judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court."
30 The 4-4 deadlock left in place the injunction issued by Judge Hanen, blocking DAPA and expanded DACA from implementation.
At this moment of writing, the fate of the DACA rescission remains unresolved. When the Trump Administration announced the rescission of DACA on September 5, 2017, it directed the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to reject all new DACA applications and to accept applications for renewal until October 5, 2017-from only those DACA recipients whose status expired between September 5, 2017 and March 5, 2018. This announcement spurred a wave of litigation and may ultimately lead to a Supreme Court ruling on DACA. Meanwhile, Congress has failed to pass legislation to either replace DACA in some form or to institute more permanent comprehensive immigration reform.
The first of the DACA rescission challenge lawsuits to bear fruit, Regents of the University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, resulted in a nationwide preliminary injunction on January 9, 2018, requiring the federal government to continue to accept renewal applications for DACA. 31 One month later, similar lawsuits in New York produced a parallel order. As a result of this litigation, as of this moment, the federal government is still accepting DACA renewal applications. , at 10-13; see also Kalhan, supra note 24, at 92 (explaining why DACA approval rates might be so high, given that anyone with a marginal application would have strong disincentives not to apply, given the high cost and potential consequences if an application was denied or deferred action was later revoked). 29 34 On August 31, 2018, Judge Hanen declined to issue an order to the federal government to stop accepting DACA renewal applications, while stating that the states were likely to succeed in their argument that the program was unlawful. Depending on the outcome of these cases, the Supreme Court may decide to hear one of the DACA cases, prolonging the uncertainty over DACA, and the tremendous precariousness DACA recipients and applicants are living with, through the summer of 2019. 35 Those who have challenged DACA and DAPA argue that President Obama exceeded his legal authority. As Hiroshi Motomura suggested, critics "seem to believe that the President has taken the law into his own hands by doing unilaterally what only Congress can do through legislation."
36 Taking the law into his own hands renders this a nation not of laws, but of men; thus, the charge that President Obama's actions violated the rule of law, actions taken to reward "lawbreakers," no less. 37 See, e.g., then-Speaker of the House John Boehner's declaration: "This executive overreach is an affront to the rule of law and to the Constitution itself." "An Affront to the Rule of Law and to the Constitution Itself," Speaker Ryan's Press Office, Jan. 14, 2015, http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/affrontrule-law-and-constitution-itself.
essential to the functioning of the system. 38 As Michael Kagan put it, "[T]he Obama Administration did not invent prosecutorial discretion in immigration law." 39 It is impossible for the government to apprehend and individually remove every non-citizen whose presence in the United States is unauthorized. Thus, there have always been exercises of discretion in determining whether particular individuals constitute a priority for removal, and this fact is reflected in legal authority. 40 The government first issued publicly available prosecutorial discretion guidelines in the 1990s, indicating when to refrain from initiating removal. Most recently, memos were issued in 2011 by then-head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement John Morton, which provided multiple criteria for officials involved in enforcement in determining whether to prioritize, delay, or stop enforcement proceedings. 41 With the announcement of DACA and DAPA, President Obama made prosecutorial discretion public, in two senses: he announced these programs as major initiatives of his administration, and members of the public, in the form of potentially eligible recipients, were invited to affirmatively apply. Affirmative application allowed individuals to "come out of the shadows" and apply at the "front end," rather than wait until they faced removal proceedings, and then request prosecutorial discretion, at the "back end."
While the highly public nature of President Obama's June 2012 and November 2014 announcements gave rise to criticism, one could also see the programs' high-profile and open quality as an attempt to shed light on executive discretion, and to give it more structure and render it "more rule-like, more centralized, and more transparent." 42 In creating a policy to bring immigrants "out of the shadows," President Obama also took "a significant step to bring immigration policy out of the shadows," making very public the discretion that had been quietly at work in the bureaucratic institutions of the executive branch of government. 43 Because DACA 10 and DAPA created a new, formal application-based system for administering discretion, many scholars have argued that, contrary to the charge that President Obama had violated the rule of law, in actuality both DACA and DAPA promote rule-of-law values such as transparency and accountability. 44 In other words, one can say that DACA and DAPA do not violate the rule of law but promote it, via a more "rational system" and a "prophylactic approach" that minimizes the occurrence of "discretion-cloaked discrimination," particularly in a field "notorious for a substantial risk of racial profiling and discrimination." 45 At the same time, the "inject[ion] of discretionary immigration policy into national politics at the highest level" away from "the technocratic world of administrative agency operations" 46 could also be understood as President Obama's attempt to build support among the Latinx electorate in a broader context where, having deported more noncitizens than any other previous president, he had been labeled the "Deporter-in-Chief." 47 The pace of these deportations was apparently the product of a political calculus that, in order to pass comprehensive immigration reform, the Obama administration needed to demonstrate its commitment to heightened border enforcement. 48 This calculation failed.
Initially, given the perception that President Obama's 2012 re-election in several key states was ensured through the Latinx electorate, it appeared that comprehensive immigration reform would pass, as the Republican Party also sought to court the Latinx vote. In June 2013, the Senate passed a bipartisan bill, Senate Bill 744, which included increased border security, a revision of lawful admission to the United States, and a program which would have regularized the status of currently undocumented immigrants. This last program had three separate streams: for young persons generally eligible for DACA; for agricultural workers; and for other undocumented immigrants. 49 But the House, dominated by newly elected Tea Party Republicans, balked. Congress 44 For a contrary view, see Zachary Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 671 (2014). At the heart of Price's concern is the idea that the president's discretion has been made impermissibly "categorical," functioning as categorical nonenforcement of the law. But see Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 42, noting the flaws with this reasoning (applications are still individually adjudicated, and ex ante rule-governed screening does not make the program an unconstitutional act of executive lawmaking). See also Motomura, The President's Dilemma, supra note 36, at 27; Amanda Frost, When Two Wrongs Make a Right: Response to Hiroshi Motomura, 55 Washburn L. J. 101 (2015); Kagan, supra note 39, at 121 (all expressing the view that DACA and DAPA comport with the rule of law). One could also point to the fact that previous presidents have frequently granted discretionary relief on a class-wide basis to large numbers of undocumented immigrants. See Legomsky, supra note 28, at 22-25. 45 Motomura, The President's Dilemma, supra note 36, at 25, 28; Kagan, supra note 39, at 121. 46 Kagan, supra note 39, at 121. 47 See, e.g., Barack Obama, Deporter-in-Chief, Economist, Feb. 8, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/ leaders/21595902-expelling-record-numbers-immigrants-costly-waymake-america-less-dynamic-barack-obama. 48 Gretchen Gavett, Cecilia Muñoz: "Even Broken Laws Have to be Enforced," Frontline, Oct. 18, 2011, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/cecilia-munoz-even-broken-laws-have-to-be-enforced; see also David Hernández, "My Fellow Citizens": Barack Obama and Immigration Policy, 6 J. Race & Pol'y 1 (2010). 49 See Muneer Ahmad, Beyond Earned Citizenship, 52 Harvard Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review 258 (2017). also considered, but never enacted, legislation known as the DREAM Act, which would have specifically regularized the status of young persons generally eligible for DACA.
The fact that Congress considered but did not pass this legislation benefitting undocumented immigrants was taken by some critics to mean that President Obama could not continue to engage in executive action on behalf of undocumented immigrants, because DACA and DAPA violated the "spirit" of the immigration laws. 50 Here critics invoked the idea of DACA and DAPA as an unlawful "executive amnesty" or "backdoor amnesty."
"Amnesty" must be understood here as a reference to provisions of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which enabled an estimated 2.7 million undocumented immigrants to become legal permanent residents. 51 More generally, amnesty also refers to a sovereign act of forgiveness, forgetting, or pardoning of illegal action via a kind of "legal alchemy" whereby the unlawful are made lawful. 52 Amnesty, clemency, and pardon are prerogatives that define a sovereign power. The term "executive amnesty" suggests that, while Congress foreclosed this possibility legislatively, President Obama through DACA and DAPA sought to create it through executive action. Further, "back-door amnesty" implies that this was amnesty created through furtive, illicit means. But the very idea that this was "amnesty" presumed that DACA and DAPA created legal permanent resident status, enabling undocumented immigrants to stay permanently as legal residents of the United States and to be given what is colloquially known as a "green card." Yet, in truth, DACA and DAPA do no such thing. The ruling by Judge Hanen is in part responsible for this erroneous assumption; it repeatedly mistakenly stated that DAPA and DACA "confer legal status" upon their recipients. 53 Not only do DACA and DAPA not create permanent resident status, they do not confer any lawful immigration status whatsoever, nor do they provide any pathway toward legality. They only proffer temporary relief from removal, which can be revoked at any point, for any reason whatsoever-as President Trump's swift action to rescind DACA illustrates.
What DACA and DAPA do is to confer "legal presence," meaning that recipients remain technically removable but that removal is temporarily held in abeyance. "Legal presence" is a term readily understood as distinct from "legal status" by immigration scholars, but these two 50 See, e.g., Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: Congressional Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 Geo. L.J. Online 96 (2015). As Stephen Legomsky notes, congressional inaction tells us nothing about Congress's intentions; if it did "the failed attempt of the 113th Congress to block DACA and DAPA would be at least as indicative of Congress's intentions as Congress's failure to enact the DREAM Act or comprehensive immigration reform." Legomsky, supra note 28, at 20. 51 Then-President Ronald Reagan expressed support for "amnesty for those who have put down roots and lived here, even though some time back they may have entered illegally." See A Reagan Legacy: Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, Nat'l Pub. Radio, July 4, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=128303672. For a description of how the term amnesty shifted in its valence to its use as a derogatory term, see Ahmad, supra note 49.12 terms are conflated by the public, and they even caused confusion during the oral arguments in United States v. Texas before the Supreme Court: Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito repeatedly asked the Solicitor General how someone can be both "lawfully present" and present in violation of the law. 54 Even though DACA and DAPA grant only revocable legal presence and not permanent legal status, is it possible that they grant or facilitate acquisition of most of the benefits of legal status, such as freedom from removal and work authorization? So claims Peter Margulies, who argues that DACA and DAPA can be understood as offering the "equivalent" of legal status, at least over the "short to intermediate term." 55 The underlying presumption here is that immigration status, like property in general, can be separated into a kind of bundle of sticks, and that access to two of the sticks (temporary freedom from removal plus work authorization) should be understood as identical to a temporally limited possession of the whole bundle, particularly because "[u]ndocumented immigrants, like most human beings, make decisions based on the short term."
56 But there are a number of problems with this argument.
57 DAPA and DACA are utterly revocable at the government's discretion. The "short term" may be exceedingly short. Revocation can happen for any reason, which may have nothing to do with one's personal merits. In fact, President Trump's swift move to rescind DACA within the first year of his presidency only highlights how vulnerable DACA recipients were to the prospect of deportation all along. Even as legal challenges have prevented the complete dissolution of DACA, many individuals have lost DACA status and face an imminent risk of removal. 58 And it is also the case that by looking myopically only at the very near term, one fails to see that the key fact that distinguishes legal status from lawful presence is the possibility of permanent residence and aspirational immunity from deportation.
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Sociologists Roberto Gonzales, Veronica Terriquez, and Stephen Ruszczyk, who have been studying a national sample of DACA recipients, have found that while DACA recipients experienced a pronounced increase in economic opportunities through DACA, such as getting a new job, opening their first bank account, or obtaining their first credit card, it is also the case that they continue to suffer from the constant threat of deportation that hangs over themselves, their 54 See Linda Greenhouse, When Smart Supreme Court Justices Play Dumb, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 2016 ("It turns out that the phrase 'lawful presence,' understood as a term embedded in the labyrinth of statutes, regulations and practice of immigration law, doesn't have the obvious meaning it would have in everyday speech, namely that someone is in the country legally and has the right to remain here. Is that really so hard for two of the top lawyers in the United States to understand?"). 55 Peter Margulies, Deferred Action and the Bounds of Agency Discretion: Reconciling Policy and Legality in Immigration Enforcement, 55 Washburn L.J. 143 (2015).
56 Id. at 171 n.135. Margulies points to data summarized by George Loewenstein and Ted O'Donoghue indicating that "humans are inherently myopic." 57 Margulies does note one concern with this analogy, which is that lawful permanent residency carries with it the ability to sponsor close relatives for immigration admissions; no such benefit comes with DAPA or DACA. 60 DACA also does not overcome the steepest barrier to postsecondary education, namely federal aid, which is unavailable to all undocumented immigrant students, including those on DACA. 61 Accordingly, it is simply incorrect to say that deferred action is functionally equivalent to legal status. Because these two are not equivalent, the relationship between the undocumented immigrant who would receive DACA or DAPA and the regime of immigration law remains unchanged; she remains unlawfully in the United States. Thus, the claim that President Obama was actually a monarch who engaged in an impermissible "change in legal regime" through illegally making law via "backdoor amnesty" is patently incorrect.
Discretionary Executive Power Outside the Law
Stepping back from the immediate context of DACA and DAPA, it becomes apparent that the programs perturbed critics, not only because they purportedly grant "executive amnesty" to "illegal aliens," but because of more general concerns about discretionary executive power. How is the president's ability to act bounded? What are the legal limits?
One useful analogy to DACA and DAPA is executive clemency, with the power to pardon lodged in the president or head of state. The Pardon Clause of the U.S. Constitution declares that the president "shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment."
62 Exercises of executive discretion-pardon, clemency, amnesty-perennially raise the question of whether they should be considered a kind of exceptional sovereign act, whereby executive officials decide who shall be offered mitigation from the full force of the law, or whether they should be understood to function within and in accord with the rule of law.
Consider the relationship between pardon and DACA or DAPA. Could we conceptualize DACA or DAPA to be a form of pardon? Not really. In contrast to a pardon, neither DACA nor DAPA wipes away the offending act-the criminal act, in the case of pardon; the immigration violation, in the case of DACA or DAPA. DACA and DAPA merely provide that the state will defer action for a specified period of time. There is thus no wiping of a slate clean or starting over, no forgetting or forgiving.
Peter Markowitz makes the fascinating argument that, in the wake of the Supreme Court's 4-4 deadlock in United States v. Texas, President Obama should have used his pardon power on behalf of the individuals who now cannot benefit from DAPA. Thus, pardon appeared here not as an analogy to DAPA or DACA, but as an alternative remedy to undocumented presence. As Markowitz notes, the pardon power includes the ability to grant broad categorical amnesties in the public interest.
64 He points to the historical large-scale actions of President Lincoln's categorical amnesty to all former supporters of the Confederate States, and President Carter's pardon to around one half million men who had violated draft laws to avoid service during the Vietnam War. 65 An undocumented immigrant is a person engaged in a civil infraction, not a criminal offense. 66 While the pardon power is often presumed to exist only for criminal violations, the Supreme Court has in fact twice considered its application outside criminal contexts, in both cases reading the clause to reach beyond criminal boundaries.
67 There thus appears to be potentially applicable (although quite old) legal precedent. Like DACA or DAPA, a pardon would leave the undocumented immigrant with the same legal status as before, undocumented. The immigrant would also not receive work authorization. But the immigrant would be shielded from future deportation based upon the immigration violation that would now be pardoned, a protection unavailable through DACA or DAPA.
Regardless of whether the presidential pardon power is an apt analogy or an alternative remedy, this comparison helps illuminate some of the anxiety surrounding the legitimacy of DAPA and DACA. Austin Sarat writes that "acts of clemency are quintessentially sovereign acts in that they are authored by law as moments when officials can decide who shall be removed from the purview of the law." 68 Thus, clemency exists in a kind of liminal borderland, as emblematic of sovereignty, being both a product of the law and also an exception to the law. The pardon power is legally created, but, once pardoned, the subject granted clemency is given an exception from punishment. An act of discretion by the sovereign official-whether a pardon or a program like DAPA or DACA-troubles the presumption of regularity of the rule of law, which is that there is no border or end to the rule of law, as the sovereign is entirely contained within the law which produces his or her authority. Because of this presumption, sovereign discretion-deciding upon the exception, removing a subject from the purview of regular law-can become equated with illegitimacy and illegality. 69 Thus, at the root of the articulated concern that President Obama violated the rule of law with DAPA or DACA is an anxiety about the idea of discretion and about the fact that the boundaries of legality are not entirely fixed or stable. The conventional terms of the debate presume the contrary, in asking whether DAPA and DACA are entirely inside the law and legal; or outside the law and illegal.
The idea that there is a clear inside and a clear outside is not a presumption unique to how the law is imagined. There is a spatio-territorial backdrop to the law that similarly presumes there are clear borders, with a seamless relationship between territory and governance. 70 But borders can be fuzzy, and the jurisdiction of the sovereignty is not always coterminous with territorial borders. 71 The notion of an apparent inside or outside also tracks the rhetorical location of the immigrants who would be benefitted by DACA and DAPA: according to supporters of these programs, they are (future) members who are already inside a political community or, according to DACA and DAPA's critics, they are "illegal aliens," which in fact locates them "outside the law." 72 This is a framing which precisely tracks the majority and dissenting opinions' dissonant visions of undocumented immigrants in the 1982 Supreme Court decision Plyler v. Doe, one placing undocumented immigrant children inside, as future members of society, and the other placing "illegal alien" children outside, with no right to belong. 73 Yet the undocumented immigrants whom DACA and DAPA sought to aid exist in a kind of contradictory space; physically present over time, with roots and stakes that suggest belonging, at the same time that they dwell in the United States without legal authorization. We could consider this kind of ambiguous existence as life in a gray zone, or as a form of "liminal legality." 74 "left open by a surrounding belt of restriction," thus providing an important space for equitable remedies. 75 But discretion always also occupies the marginal space of "law's borderland." 76 This clarifies that executive discretion does not always make itself available as a tool of leniency or equity. The same discretionary sovereign prerogative that enables clemency, as in DAPA and DACA, also enables states of emergency, military tribunals on Guantánamo, and killings by drone strikes. 77 Any assessment as to the legality of these acts by the executive will be shaped, not only by their merits, but also by the perception of the executive actor's legitimacy.
"Barack Obama, American Caudillo"
In a column chastising President Obama for "issuing an executive amnesty for illegal immigrants based on blatant contempt for the constitutional order that he is sworn to uphold," Rich Lowry labeled President Obama an "American Caudillo." 78 Similarly, New York Times columnist Ross Douthat, also writing about DAPA, charged: "President Obama is pursuing . . . domestic Caesarism." 79 Both of these descriptions conjured up a chimera intended to provoke fear, conjoining a hybridization of United States democracy with an illegitimate governmental form that is both foreign and antidemocratic, practiced by Latin American dictators or the Roman empire. Yet the issue was not just a governmental term or form that sounds presumptively foreign, and therefore an antidemocratic exercise of presidential power, rather it was the body of President Obama himself. Thus, we can see how the notion that President Obama's executive immigration actions amounted to a "political regime change" expressed fears, here not about the bounds of sovereign power more generally, but very particularly about President Obama's person.
